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1. Introduction 
  The general company law system was introduced into Japan for the first time as a 
part of the first Japanese Commercial Code of 1890 which was imported from Ger-
manyl). The current Japanese company law in 1899 was also modelled on German 
company law. 
  After the Second World War, the Japanese company law was amended drastically 
in accordance with directives of General Headquarters of the Allied Forces (GHQ)2). 
The amended company law was based mainly on US corporate law3). Consequently, 
it has been often said that Japanese company law is like a grafted tree. In fact, there 
are many problems not only in doctrinal but also functional aspects ofour company 
law. 
  The supervisory system ofa public limited company (kabushiki-kaisha, plc) isone 
of the clearest cases of this kind4). This paper will examine the objectives and
1)
2) 
3)
4)
Associate Professor of Commercial Law, Faculty of Law, Osaka University, Japan. The author would like 
to thank Ms. Michelle Tan for her editorial help. 
The first Japanese Commercial Code (JCC) was drafted by the German lawyer Hennann Roesler in 1890 
but its enforcement was suspended until 1893 as a result of a postponement of he introduction of the first 
Japanese Civil Code which was criticized for its liberal character. In1899, the current Japanese Commercial 
Code revised the first Commercial Code. 
See generally, H. Oda, Japanese Law (Butterworths, 1992), p.261. 
K.Yamaguchi and N.Tozuka, The situation of the Corporation Management in Japanese Corporate System, 
18 Osaka Univ.L.Rev.1, 3(1971). 
There are four types of company in Japan. These are: a public limited company, a private limited company 
(yûgen-kaisha),  partnership company (gomei-kaisha) and a limited partnership company (gôshi-kaisha). 
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effectiveness of the 1993 amendment regarding the supervisory system of a public 
limited company.
2. The Historical Background of the 1993 Amendment 
2-1. The 1950 Amendments) 
  Before the 1950 company law amendment, Japanese company law required a pic 
to have a two-tier administration structure as in German company law (Aktiengsetz). 
The management organ (torishimariyaku) managed the business of the company and 
the supervisory organ (kansayaku) monitored and reviewed the legality and perfor-
mance of the management organ's activities. Members of the supervisory organ could 
not be members of the management organ at the came time, but unlike German law, 
the general meeting of shareholders elected both members of the management and the 
supervisory organs. It was therefore difficult for the supervisory organ to control the 
management organ because it did not have the power to elect or dismiss management 
members who were armed with proxies to vote from their large shareholders. 
  The 1950 amendment introduced an American style board of directors system 
(torishimariyakukai) into a plc. The general meeting of shareholders appoints at least 
three directors (JCC Art.255) who form the board of directors. The board of directors 
elects one or several representative directors (daihyo-torishimariyaku) who have the 
authority to direct all the business of their company and to represent i to a third party 
(JCC Art.261 para.1)6)• The board also oversees the activities of the representative 
directors and members of the board. 
  Thus, it was felt that therewas no need to give the supervisory organ a supervisory 
power over the conduct of the directors in addition to the monitoring function of the 
board of directors. Although there were some arguments for the abolishment of the 
supervisory organ, finally it was decided that it should continue to exist with a limited
5) 
6)
Unlike under German company law, a partnership company and a limited partnership company also have a 
legal personality as an incorporated body. See, Doing Business in Japan, vol.4, §1.03 (Matthew Bender, 
1981). They are all defined under JCC and the Private Limited Company Act (Law No.74, 1938) as an 
association established for the purpose of conducting commercial transactions as a business (JCC Art.52 and 
PLCA Arts. 1, 2). There are about one million and three hundred thousand public limited companies of which 
at most 2200 are listed companies, as well as over one million and six hundred thousand private limited 
companies in Japan. Almost all these companies are small or medium sized. The main reasons for the large 
number of companies are tax privileges and advantages in recruiting employees. Oda, supra. n.2 at p.265. 
Law No.167, 1950. 
As to the historical perspective of a legal position of the representative directors, see, K. Yamaguchi, Legal 
Position of Managing Directors in Japanese Company Law-Historical Perspective-, 26 Osaka Univ. L. 
Rev.9 (1979).
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power as regards auditing company's accounts7). 
  Unfortunately, this mixed systemof German and American law did not work well. 
In Japan, the functions of the directors and executive officers are not clearly distin-
guished as in American corporate law and practice. Most directors are also executive 
members uch as a president, a vice-president, a senior executive director (senmu-
torishimariyaku) and a junior executive director (jômu-torishimariyaku), or are 
worker-officers who have a legal relationship with the company as an employee as 
well. There are few non-executive or outside members on the boards). Accordingly, 
most directors are subject and subordinate to the direction of the representative 
directors, the president in particular, for their daily decision-making regarding busi-
ness, and do not have enough independence from them to supervise and control the 
latter effectively9).
2-2. The 1974 Amendment'o) 
  In 1974, the company law regarding the pic was reformed and the Act Providing 
an Exception to the Commercial Code for the Supervisory System of a PLC (AECS) 
came into effect. The amended company law gave a supervisory power to the super-
visory organ again in order to create an effective control over the board of directors 
(JCC Art.274 para. 1)"). AECS laid down a compulsory auditing system by a certifi-
cated public accountant (CPA) or an accounting firm for large companies with a stated 
capital of ¥l billion or more which included most listed companies'2). 
  In a large plc, the auditing responsibility was firstly entrusted to a CPA or an 
accounting firm and it was expected that the supervisory organ should concentrate its 
duties on the review and control of the conduct of the directors. As mentioned before, 
however, the board of directors till had a monitoring power over the representative 
directors and other individual members of the board. Hence, there seemed to be a 
duplication of two supervisory functions in the administration of a plc and a need to 
harmonize these two supervisory functions with each other. According to the majority 
of legal academics, the supervisory organ should check the legality of the business 
conduct of the directors, whereas the board of directors should supervise the
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11)
12)
Yamaguchi and Tozuka, supra. n.3 at p.3. 
Oda, supra. n.2 at p.285. 
Yamaguchi and Tozuka, supra. n.3 at p.15. 
Law Nos. 21 & 22, 1974. 
By the Act Providing an Exception, the supervisory organ of a plc with a stated capital of X100 million or 
less luis only an auditing power egarding the company's accounting matters. AECS Arts.22, 25. 
Oda, supra. n.2 at p.262-63, 292.
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reasonableness and appropriateness of the conduct by the representative directors and 
other executive members13) 
  It is clear from the above, that Japanese company law is unique in its approach to 
the supervisory system and corporate govemance of a plc. As will be discussed later, 
it may be understandable that Japanese company law divides and distributes one 
supervisory function into two organs in a plc.
2-3. The 1981 Amendmentt4) 
  In the 1981 amendment of the Act Providing an Exception to the Commercial Code 
for the Supervisory System of a PLC, every large plc with a stated capital of ¥500 
million or more or with a liability of ¥20 billion or more, was required to have at least 
two members and one full-time member in the supervisory organ. It was intended by 
this amendment to reinforce the supervisory power of that organ by strengthening its 
monitoring abilityl5> 
  Despite these legislative efforts, neither the supervisory organ nor the board of 
directors were able to supervise and control the representative directors effectively. 
There were several notorious cases where some leading companies in banking and 
securities trading fields whose names have worldwide reputations were severely 
criticized for their misconduct and a failure of these two organs to carry out their 
functions respectively in late 80's, after the crash of the so-called bubble economy. It 
was thought this was a result of dependence by members of the supervisory organ and 
the board of directors on the representative directors. They are dependent on the latter 
for promotion up the hierarchical company organization because candidates for new 
members of the board and the supervisory organ are almost always decided and 
submitted to the board of directors by the representative directors. In addition, their 
remunerations are actually decided by the representative directors16). Thus, the next
13) 
14) 
15) 
16)
Ibis is still a matter of dispute among many academics and practitioners. 
Law No.74, 1981. 
Oda, supra. n.2 ai p.263, 292. 
In Japanese company law, it is the responsibility of the board of directors to draft and submit a bill of 
resolution to elect members of the supervisory organ and the board of directors at the general meeting. In 
exceptional cases, one or several shareholders in concert having at least 1 percent of the outstanding shares 
can propose their own bill to the general meeting (JCC Art.233-2). Remunerations of members of the 
supervisory organ and the board of directors must be decided in the company's statute (articles) or by the 
shareholders resolution in general meeting (JCC Art.269, 279). However, it is a usual custom in Japanese 
company to resolve at the shareholders meeting to entrust the supervisory organ and the board of directors 
respectively the power to decide remunerations of each member of these organs within the sum decided by 
the shareholders resolution. And in most circumstances, the board of directors decides to entrust the power
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step in securing the functions of supervisory system was to assure the independence 
of the members of the supervisory organ from the representative directors.
3. Substance of the 1993 Amendment17) 
  After the 1981 amendment, a preparatory work on the next company law amend-
ment was initiated by the Ministry of Justice. This work was intended to cover all the 
entire field of the company law but some urgent matters obliged the govemment to 
change its mind and to amend the company law partially in 19901s). 
  After the 1990 amendment, the work on the revision of the company law continued. 
This work included the strengthening of shareholders' rights and powers and the 
ensuring the independence of the supervisory organ. At the time, there were on-going 
negotiation talks between the Japanese and American govemments relating to the 
improvement of the trade imbalance between Japan and the US (Structural Impediment 
Initiative). During these negotiations, the American government pressured Japan to, 
inter alia, amend Japanese company law in order to protect shareholders interests. It 
was argued by the American representatives that it is necessary to promote the 
shareholders derivative suit which was introduced from US corporation law and 
seldom used successfully in Japan and to require a plc to have an outside director. The 
Japanese government promised to amend its company law in order to alleviate restric-
tions on the shareholders derivative suit, but argued it would be preferable to require 
an outside member in the supervisory organ, which US corporate law doesn't have, 
rather than in the board of directors. The amendment bill was drafted quickly and 
passed the Diet in June 1993.
3-1. The amended provision which applies to all pics 
  It is provided that the terra of members of the supervisory organ is for three years 
(JCC Art.273 para.1). Before this amendment, his terra was for two years. It is 
expected that this extension of the terra will help to strengthen the independence of the 
members of the supervisory organ and to allow them Lime to gain a thorough 
knowledge of company's business affairs.
3-2. Amended provisions which apply to large pics
   to decide their emunerations to a representative director (the president). This practice was affirmed by our 
   case law. See, the Supreme Court case of 22.2.1983 (hanrei jihô, no.1076, p.140). 
17) Law No.62, 1993. 
18) Law No.64, 1990. This amendment did not relate to the supervisory s stem of a plc.
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  a. Firstly, every large pic is required to have at least three supervisory members 
(AECS Art.18 para.1). This is because they constitute a supervisory board (AECS 
Art. 18-2 para. 1). The increase in the statutory minimum number and the creation of 
the supervisory board is intended to be an effective method for allowing members to 
maintain their independence from the representative directors. Another aim of the 
creation of the supervisory board is to make it possible to divide the monitoring work 
and responsibility of the supervisory board among members and to make a systematic 
supervisory organization. In a large plc in particular, since a company's business 
affairs covers a very wide range and is extremely complex, it is hardly possible for a 
single supervisory member to cover all these fields. Many large companies already 
have a voluntary supervisory board and divide their tasks among the supervisory 
members. This latest amendment has thus ratified these practices.
  b. Secondly, a large plc must have at least one outside member on its supervisory 
board (AECS Art. 18 para. 1). The outside member must be a person who has not been 
a director, manager (shihainin) and employee of the company or any subsidiaries of 
the company for a period of at least five years before his/her appointment as a 
supervisory member. 
  In Japan, the majority of new members of the supervisory organ are elected from 
the former directors who have completed their terra of office as a director. Conse-
quently, there are problems of self-supervising19) and members' dependence on the 
representative directors who directed the company's business during the members' 
period of office as a director and actually decided their membership of the supervisory 
board. 'Mis amendment requires an outside member who has not been connected in 
any way with the company business affairs as an insider for at least five years before 
the appointment, thus it will help to reinforce the independence of the supervisory 
board. Although it would be better to prohibit anyone who was once an insider from 
becoming a supervisory member, it was thought hat this would be too strict to find 
appropriate persons for a supervisory member.
4. Some Comparative Remarks to EC company law 
  As mentioned above, the supervisory system in a pic has been a vital issue in
19) Members of the supervisory organ often review their own conduct retrospectively after becoming a member 
   of the organ. The Supreme Court has held that the supervisory acts by such a member of the supervisory 
   organ are not a violation of the provision which prohibits a supervisory member to be a director (JCC 
   Art.276). See, the Supreme Court case of 21.4.1987 (shôjihômu, no.1110, p.79).
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Japanese company law for many years, and remains so20). Why doesn't it function 
well despite numerous amendments othe law? The answer to this question seems to 
be rather simple. It is because company law amendments have failed to create and 
maintain the independence of supervisory members from the representative directors. 
  In Japan, it is not uncommon for the representative directors to climb up the ladder 
of personnel positions in the organizational hierarchy of the company. Most directors 
and supervisory members were also former full-time employees21). Formany directors 
and supervisory members, the representative directors might have once been their boss 
and the latter have assisted their promotion to upper personnel positions'). In addition, 
the representative directors usually have the power to decide membership of the 
supervisory organ and their remunerations. In these circumstances, they were once 
subordinates of the representative directors and hence it is hardly possible for them to 
actively supervise the conduct of the representative directors23>_ 
  On this malter, EC company law harmonization presents very useful materials for 
us to study comparatively in order to plan a better supervisory system and corporate 
govemance structure24). Firstly, the Second Amendment to the Proposal for a Fifth 
Company Law Directive issued by the EC commission in 19912$ requires member 
states to provide that the company shall be organized according to a two-tier system 
(management organ and supervisory organ), but allows them to permit the company 
to have a choice between a two-tier system and a one-tier system (administrative 
organ)(Art.2)261. Under this proposai, the supervisory function is assigned to a super-
20)
21)
22) 
23)
24)
25) 
26)
In Japan, the general meeting of shareholders does not have enough power and incentive to monitor the 
management of the company as in many other countries. Recently, however, it is often pointed out that 
Japanese cross-shareholding and keiretsu among financial and industrial companies provides an efficient 
monitoring system on the company's management. See e.g., R.J. Gilson and M.J. Roe, Understanding the 
Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Govemance and Industrial Organization, 102 Yale LJ. 
871(1993). 
Oda, supra. n.2 at p.28S. See also, MJ. Roe, Some Différence in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, 102 Yale L.J. 1927, 1943 (1993). 
Yamaguchi and Tozuka, supra. n.3 at p.15. 
The so-called management control has been realized but in a différent way in Japan from other countries. 
It has been said that the seniority rule applies evenly to the corporate managers as well as the manual workers. 
See, Yamaguchi and Tozuka, supra. n.3 at p.4. 
Fora comparative study of the supervision of company's management in the EC and the US, see, A. Conard, 
The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in European Community and 
United States Law, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1459 (1984). 
OJ C7/04, 11.1.1991. 
This provision was not amended by the third amendment o the proposai for a fifth company law directive. 
See, OJ C321/09,12.12.1991.
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visory organ in a two-tier system on the one hand, and to non-executive members of 
an administrative organ in a one-tier system on the other hand. In each case there is 
no problem of overlapping of supervisory functions among the company's organs as 
in Japanese company law. More importantly, an organ or members which exercise a 
supervisory power have the authority to appoint members of the management organ 
or executive members of the administrative organ in each system. Consequently, the 
supervisory organ or non-executive members can effectively control the activities of 
the management organ or executive members of the administrative organ by this power 
of appointment. 
  Secondly, the amended proposai for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a 
European Company27) provides that the statute of the European Company (SE) shah 
organize the structure of the SE either according to a two-tier system (management 
board and supervisory board) or according to a one-tier system (administrative board). 
The proposai further allows member states to require that SEs having their registered 
office in its territory adopt either the two-tier or the one-tier system (Art.61 para.1). 
The members of the management board shah be appointed and removed by the 
supervisory board in the two-tier system (Art.62 para.2), but members of the ad-
ministrative board shah be appointed and removed by the general meeting in the 
one-tier system (Art.66 para.3). In the latter case however, it is unclear that the 
non-executive members of the administrative organ shah supervise the executive 
members of that organ, because it is not mandatorily required that members of the 
administrative organ shah be divided into executive and non-executive members. 
  Thus, it is noteworthy from the above-mentioned that as an general organizational 
principle, it is necessary for the supervisory organ to have the power to appoint 
management members in order to effectively carry out its supervisory function in 
corporate governance structure. This is the only way for supervisory members to 
effectively control the activities of the management members. 
  It is true that the board of directors has both the power of appointment of the 
representative directors and the power of supervision in Japanese company law. 
Nevertheless, mort directors are executive members or worker-officers as mentioned 
before. It may be said that the supervision essentially means the independent review 
from outside. Consequently, the directors' executive or worker function appears to be 
inconsistent with their monitoring position over the activities of the representative 
directors. On the other hand, it is the supervisory organ that is expected to exercise 
the power of supervision from the outside standpoint in Japanese company law. But it
27) 0J C176ro1, 8.7.1991.
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does not have the power of appointment of the representative directors. 
  Hence it is a special feature of our company law relating to the supervisory system 
and corporate governance that the supervisory function and the power of appointment 
which should accompany it necessarily are divided and distributed to différent organs 
of the company. This not only causes problems of duplication of supervisory function 
between the board of directors and the supervisory organ, but also results in neither 
organ working effectively. Therefore, the next amendment to the Japanese company 
law regarding the supervisory system might be aimed at securing the power of 
appointment of the representative directors by the supervisory organ.
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